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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, a developer sought a zoning change to a
parcel of land in Arlington Heights, Illinois that would allow for the
construction of low-income housing. Arlington Heights denied the
zoning change and the developer sued Arlington Heights arguing that
this denial violated both equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the federal Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"). The case reached the United States Supreme
Court on the equal protection issue and the Court held that the
developer did not establish an equal protection violation because it
failed to prove that a racially discriminatory purpose motivated
Arlington Heights' denial of the zoning change. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the FHA claims.'
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the denial of the zoning change that the developer
sought from Arlington Heights had the discriminatory effect of
perpetuating residential racial segregation there, and unless the lowincome housing project could feasibly be built at another site in
Arlington Heights, the denial of the zoning change constituted a
violation of the FHA.2 After this decision by the Seventh Circuit, the
parties entered into a consent decree in which Arlington Heights
agreed to annex another parcel of land and allow the construction of

* Curt and Linda Rodin Professor of Law and Social Justice, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law.
I The case discussed in the paragraph came from Village of Arlington Heights v.
MetropolitanHousing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
2 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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the developer's low-income housing project on it.3 The developer's
project was eventually built on the land that Arlington Heights
annexed, and the low-income housing project opened to a diverse
population of residents in 1983.
The construction of the developer's low-income housing
project in Arlington Heights was facilitated by the Seventh Circuit's
decision that a denial of housing that has the discriminatory effect of
perpetuating residential racial segregation violates the FHA even if a
In 2013, the federal
discriminatory purpose is not established.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") issued a
rule that the FHA could be violated by, inter alia, housing decisions
that have the discriminatory effect of perpetuating residential
segregation.' In 2015, the United States Supreme Court determined
that a housing policy that has a disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities and otherwise lacks a legitimate rationale is cognizable
under the FHA.
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the Seventh
Circuit's decision in the Arlington Heights case is an important judicial
precedent for using the FHA to challenge housing decisions that
perpetuate housing segregation. The article seeks to explain how the
Seventh Circuit's decision that Arlington Heights must accommodate
the construction of low-income housing in order to comply with the
FHA presages interpretations of the FHA by both HUD and the
Supreme Court that occurred more than 35 years later. These broad
interpretations of the FHA create valuable tools to achieve one of the
primary goals of the FHA-the residential integration of the races in
the United States. Finally, this article will address 2018 efforts by
HIJD to review its 2013 discriminatory effect rule in light of the
Supreme Court's 2015 decision. This article will examine whether
HUD's current regulatory review process should alter how the
discriminatory effect standard involving the perpetuation of residential
segregation will be applied in the future to determine whether the FHA
has been violated.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg
11460-501 (Feb. 15, 2013).
1 Tex. Dep't. ofHous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
4
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BACKGROUND OF THE ARLINGTON HEIGHTS CASE

A.

Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois

Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, Illinois that is
located approximately 26 miles northwest of Chicago's downtown. 6
In 1970, the population of Arlington Heights was 64,884, of whom 27
residents were black.7 Only 137 of the 13,000 persons who worked in
Arlington Heights in 1970 were black and almost all of these 137
blacks lived in Chicago.' The northwest suburban townships of
Chicago, of which Arlington Heights is a part, experienced a
population increase of 219,000 people from 1960 to 1970 but only 170
of the new residents were black.' During the same time period, the
proportion of the black population in the Chicago metropolitan area
increased from 14% to 18%. o
B.

Clerics of St. Viator (Clerics)

The Clerics of St. Viator ("Clerics"), a Catholic religious order,
owned 80 acres of land in Arlington Heights on which they operated a
novitiate and a high school." The Clerics' 80 acre parcel of land was
surrounded by single family homes.1 2 Most of the 80 acres were vacant
land, and the Clerics decided in 1970 to devote some of this vacant
land to low- and moderate-income housing.13
C.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(MHDC)

The Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
("MHDC") is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that was created in
1968 to develop low- and moderate-income housing in the Chicago
metropolitan area.' 4 In 1970, the Clerics entered into an agreement to
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977).
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1286-87.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 414 n.2 (7th Cir.
1975).
9 Id. at 414.
6

10 Id.

" Id. at 411.
12 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977).
13 Id.

14 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d at 410-11.
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sell 15 of their 80 acres to MIHDC at the bargain price of $300,000,
contingent upon MHDC securing a zoning change from Arlington
Heights and obtaining financial assistance from the federal
government to build subsidized housing that would be racially
integrated.15 MHDC developed plans to build Lincoln Green, 20 twostory buildings totaling 190 residential units with a mix of single
bedroom and multiple bedroom units, on the 15 acre site. 16
D.

Arlington Heights Zoning Law

Most of the land in Arlington Heights was zoned for detached
single family homes.' 7 The 80 acre parcel owned by the Clerics as well
as all of the land bordering it was zoned R-3, limiting its use to single
family homes. 8 In order for Lincoln Green to be built by MHDC, the
15 acres that MHDC bought from the Clerics needed to be rezoned R5, allowing for the construction of multifamily units.19 The 1959
Comprehensive Plan of Arlington Heights provided that land should
only be zoned R-5 as a buffer between single family homes and
commercial, industrial or other high intensity uses.2 0 In the early
1970s, there were 60 tracts of land in Arlington Heights that were
zoned R-5 and some of them were vacant land.2 1
MHDC applied to Arlington Heights for a zoning change from
R-3 to R-5 for the 15 acre parcel it bought from the Clerics to allow
for the construction of Lincoln Green there.22 MHDC worked with the
Arlington Heights staff in a preliminary review process and every
change recommended by the staff during these consultations was
incorporated into the rezoning application that MHDC submitted to the
Plan Commission.2 3 The Plan Commission considered MHDC's
rezoning application at three public meetings in the spring of 1971 that
drew large crowds. 24 The public comments at these meetings were

1s Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 256-57.
6 Id.
17 Id. at 255.
" Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d at 411.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill.

1974).
22 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d. at 411.
23

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257 (1977).

24 Id.
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mixed, but many of the persons who attended them were both
demonstrative and vocal in opposition to Lincoln Green.25 At the
conclusion of its third meeting, the Plan Commission recommended,
with two members dissenting, that the 15 acre parcel was not an
appropriate location for low- and moderate-income housing.26 On
September 28, 1971, the Village Board met to consider MHDC's
rezoning application and the Plan Commission's recommendation, and
after hearing from the public, the Board voted 6-1 to deny MHDC's
rezoning application. 7
LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE DENIAL OF MHDC's
REZONING APPLICATION BY ARLINGTON HEIGHTS

III.

A.

Plaintiffs' Complaint

In June 1972, MHDC and three black persons sued Arlington
Heights and several village officials in federal court2 8 asserting that the
denial of MHDC's rezoning application violated their rights under: the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983; the FHA, 42
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 2 9 One black plaintiff, Mr. Ranson, worked in
Arlington Heights but lived with his family approximately 20 miles
away and alleged in the complaint that he would seek and qualify to
live at Lincoln Green if it were built.3 0
B.

1974 District Court Decision

A district court judge conducted a trial on the merits of
plaintiffs' case and concluded on February 22, 1974 that a judgment
should be entered in favor of Arlington Heights and the other
defendants. 3 ' The district court judge found that defendants had not
violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights because the denial of
the zoning change disadvantaged low-income persons, not merely
25

Id.

26 Id. at 258.
27 Id.
28 Id.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
30 Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264.
" Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 373 F. Supp. at 208-09.
29
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blacks, and the denial was motivated by a desire to protect property
values and the integrity of Arlington Heights' zoning plan. 32 The
district court judge also ruled that no sections of the FHA "seem
applicable to the facts of this case." 3 3
C.

1975 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

The plaintiffs appealed the 1974 district court decision and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals only considered whether Arlington
Heights violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights by denying
MIHDC's rezoning request3 4 and did not address whether plaintiffs'
rights under the FHA were violated.3 5 The court recognized that a
greater percentage of blacks than whites would be adversely affected
by the denial of MHDC's rezoning application by defendants because
a greater percentage of blacks than whites would be financially eligible
to live in Lincoln Green if it were constructed as planned.3 6 However,
the court held that this racial disparity alone did not amount to racial
discrimination.3 7 The court then considered that Arlington Heights had
a small number of black residents (27 of 64,884 in 1970) and did not
have any other existing or planned low-income housing developments
and held that its rejection of the Lincoln Green proposal had the
racially discriminatory effect of perpetuating residential racial
segregation there.38 The court further held that Arlington Heights'
reasons for denying MHDC's rezoning request-maintaining the
integrity of its zoning plan and protecting neighboring property
values-were not sufficiently compelling interests to justify this
racially discriminatory effect, and, therefore, Arlington Heights
violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights when it denied the zoning
change.3 9

32 Id. at 2I10-11.

33 Id. at 209.
34 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 410-15 (7th Cir.

1975).
1 Id. at411-15.
36 Id. at 413.
3 Id.
38 Id. at 413-15.
39 Id. at 415.
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1977 United States Supreme Court Decision

The defendants appealed the 1975 Seventh Circuit decision,
and the United States Supreme Court reversed it and held that proof of
discriminatory purpose is required to prove racial discrimination under
equal protection.4 0 The Court acknowledged that proof of a racially
discriminatory effect can be circumstantial evidence of racially
discriminatory purpose.4 1 However, the Court found that plaintiffs
failed to prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
in the decision of Arlington Heights to deny MDC's request for a
zoning change and, therefore, equal protection was not violated.4 2 The
Court remanded the case to the lower courts to address plaintiffs'
claims under the FHA.4 3
E.

1977 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

On remand, the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision initially noted
that the Supreme Court had not reversed the holding in the 1975
Seventh Circuit decision that the denial of the zoning change by
Arlington Heights had the racially discriminatory effect of
perpetuating racial segregation there.4 4 The court then focused on
whether Arlington Heights had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the
FHA which provides that "it shall be unlawful. . . to make unavailable
or deny ... a dwelling to a person because of race, color, religion or
national origin." 45 The court held that a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(a) can be established by proof of racially discriminatory effect
without proof of racially discriminatory intent, although conduct that
shows such an effect is not necessarily a violation of 42 U.S.C §
3604(a). 4 6 Rather, whether conduct that causes such a discriminatory
effect violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) depends upon:
1. The strength of the discriminatory effect;
2. Any evidence of discriminatory intent;

40

41

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255, 265 (1977).
Id. at 266.

42 Id. at 265-71.
43 Id. at 271.

' Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (7th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
45 Id. at 1287.
46 Id. at 1290.
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Defendants' interest in the conduct that produced
the discriminatory effect; and
4. Whether plaintiffs seek defendants to affirmatively
provide housing for members of minority groups or
to restrain defendants from interfering with
property owners who wish to provide such
housing.4 7
3.

After considering these four factors, the court concluded that
since plaintiffs were seeking to effectuate the FHA's goal of creating
racially integrated housing, the denial of MHDC's rezoning
application by Arlington Heights would constitute a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) if there was no other land in Arlington Heights that
was both properly zoned and suitable for federally subsidized, lowincome housing. 48 As a result, the case was remanded to the district
court to determine whether such other land was available in Arlington
Heights and, if not, to find that Arlington Heights' denial of the zoning
change that MHDC requested violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).49
Defendants sought review of this 1977 decision of the Seventh Circuit
in the United States Supreme Court but certiorari was denied."o
F.

1979 District Court Decision

After the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the 1977
Seventh Circuit decision, the case was remanded to the district court
for proceedings consistent with this decision of the Seventh Circuit."1
The parties notified the district court judge that they had negotiated a
consent decree that they presented to the court for consideration.5 2 The
proposed consent decree provided that a slightly modified low-income
housing development would be built by MHDC on a 20 acre, vacant
parcel of currently unincorporated land located between Arlington
Heights and the neighboring Village of Mount Prospect.5 3 Under the
terms of the proposed consent decree, Arlington Heights would annex

47 Id.

Id. at 1290-94.
Id. at 1294-95.
5o 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
5i Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 843 (N.D. 111.
1979).
48

49

52 Id.

53 Id.
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this land and would designate 12 acres of it as R-5 to allow for
MHDC's construction of low-income housing on it.54 The new
development would include 190 total rental units, 109 units suitable
for elderly persons and the remaining units suitable for families.
Mount Prospect, a few local civic organizations and several
neighboring landowners were allowed to intervene in the case, and
they all objected to the entry of the proposed consent decree.5 6 The
court conducted three days of hearings on the intervenors' objections
to the consent decree, considered their objections and dismissed them
because they were overridden by strong federal policies that favor open
housing and the settlement of litigation. 57 After the intervenors were
dismissed from the case, the district judge entered the consent decree.
The intervenors appealed the entry of the consent decree to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the entry of the consent decree was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.59
IV.

LINDEN PLACE DEVELOPMENT

Pursuant to the settlement of the litigation, MHDC broke
ground in 1980 on the construction of a new low-income housing
development called Linden Place on the land that Arlington Heights
annexed. 60 Linden Place opened for occupancy in 1983 with 109 units
for senior citizens and 80 units for families. 61 The first residents of
Linden Place were approximately 60% white and the other residents
were members of minority groups. 6 2

Id. at 843, 870.
Id. at 871.
56 Id. at 836, 843-44, 847-48, 864-69.
5 Id. at 836, 844-69.
5 Id. at 869.
59 Metro. Hous. Dev. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1007, 1015 (7th Cir.
1980).
60 Dori Meinert, HousingAccepted As ControversyDies Down, CHi. TIUB.,
Aug. 31, 1983,
ND17.
61 Id.
62 Steven Morris, Subsidized Housing a Boon For Many Suburbanites, CHI. TRIB., May 5,
1984, WI.
54
5
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FHA
IN THE 1977 SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION

V.

After the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not established
an equal protection violation because they failed to prove that
defendants had acted with discriminatory purpose in denying MlHDC's
rezoning request,6 3 the Supreme Court remanded the case to consider
plaintiffs' contention that the rezoning denial violated the FHA.6 4 The
Seventh Circuit panel that considered the case on remand from the
Supreme Court in 1977 initially recognized that the Supreme Court had
not reversed the 1975 Seventh Circuit holding that the denial of
rezoning by defendants had a racially discriminatory effect.65
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit panel considering the case on remand
in 1977 reaffirmed the 1975 Seventh Circuit holding that defendants'
denial of rezoning had the discriminatory effect of perpetuating racial
residential segregation in Arlington Heights. 66 The Seventh Circuit
panel on remand then addressed whether a racially discriminatory
effect, without proof of discriminatory intent, could violate the FHA.6 7
The panel analyzed the history, language and purpose of the FHA and
held that a discriminatory effect could constitute a violation of the
FHA.6 8 The Seventh Circuit joined the Eighth Circuit in so holding.6 9
Another significant aspect of the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision
is how the court analyzed the discriminatory effect of defendants'
decision to deny MHDC's rezoning request. The court identified two
types of racially discriminatory effects which a facially neutral
decision about housing can produce. 70 The first type of discriminatory
effect occurs if the decision has a greater adverse impact on one racial
group than on another. 7 ' The second type of discriminatory effect
occurs if the decision perpetuates racial segregation in a community

63 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71
(1977).
6 Id. at 271.
65 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).

66 Id. at 1288.
67 Id.

68

Id. at 1288-90.

United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
70 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290.
69

71

Id.
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and thereby prevents interracial association among members of that
community.7 2 The court found that in this case the first type of
discriminatory effect was "relatively weak" because 60% of the
persons in the Chicago area who were eligible for federally subsidized
housing in 1970 were white. 73 However, the court held that the second
type of discriminatory effect would be established if there was no other
land in Arlington Heights which could accommodate the construction
of federally subsidized low-income housing because then the effect of
the denial of MHDC's request for rezoning would be to perpetuate
residential racial segregation in Arlington Heights.7 4 If there was no
such other land, the court held that defendants' denial of MHDC's
rezoning request would constitute a violation of section 3604(a) of the
FHA. 75 The 1977 Seventh Circuit decision was the first federal court
of appeals to hold that a housing decision that perpetuates residential
racial segregation in a community can be the discriminatory effect that
violates the FHA, independent of the decision's effect on the racial
groups protected by the FHA.76
VI.

HUD's FHA DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS RULE

In 2013, the Secretary of HUD issued a final rule promulgating
its standards for determining when a neutral housing practice that has
a discriminatory effect gives rise to liability under the FHA.7 7 Initially,
HUD pointed out that like eleven federal courts of appeal (including
the Seventh Circuit's 1977 decision in the Arlington Heights case), it
had long interpreted the FHA to prohibit housing practices with an

72 Id. The court cited Trafficante v. MetropolitanLife Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) as
support for this second type of discriminatory effect. In Trafficante, the Supreme Court held
that a black tenant and a white tenant in an apartment complex had standing under the FHA to
challenge the apartment owner's alleged racial discrimination against prospective tenants of
the complex. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212. The Supreme Court in Trafficante emphasized that
the FHA was designed to be applied broadly to promote the integration of the races and to
protect communities from discriminatory housing practices that limit interracial association.
Id. at 209-12.
7 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1291.
74 Id. at 1291-95.
7 Id. at 1288, 1295.
76 Id. at 1290, 1295.
n Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11460-501 (Feb. 15, 2013).
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unjustified discriminatory effect, regardless of whether there was an
intent to discriminate.7 8
The rule issued by HUD in 2013 defined discriminatory effect
as a practice that actually or predictably results in a disparate impact
on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates
segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex,
HUD included
handicap, familial status or national origin.7 9
segregation-perpetuating practices in the definition of discriminatory
effect because the "elimination of segregation is central to why the Fair
Housing Act was enacted."so HUD recognized that the FHA was
enacted to not only protect certain groups of persons from
discrimination in housing decisions affecting them but also to protect
entire communities from residential racial segregation." Thus, HUD's
2013 rule adopted the principle first developed in the 1977 Seventh
Circuit decision in the Arlington Heights case that housing practices
that have the effect of perpetuating racial residential segregation in a
community are independently actionable under the FHA.
The HUD 2013 rule did alter the FHA legal doctrine developed
in the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision in one important way. The 1977
Seventh Circuit decision adopted a four-part balancing test for
determining whether a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.82
HUD's 2013 rule establishes a three-part burden-shifting test for
determining when a housing practice with a discriminatory effect
violates the FHA: 1) the alleged victim of discrimination has the
burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will
cause a discriminatory effect (i.e., a prima facie case); 2) if a prima
facie case is established, the alleged perpetrator of discrimination has
the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to
achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests; 3) if such an interest(s) is established, the alleged victim of
discrimination may still prevail by proving that the interest(s) served
by the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has
a less discriminatory effect. 83

Id. at 11460, 11462 n.28.
79 Id. at 11467-68, 11482 (codified at 20 C.F.R.
78

80

Id. at 11469.

81

Id.

§ 100.500(a)).

82 Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 11482 (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)).
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HUD's 2013 rule followed the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision
in several important respects. HUD accepted that a violation of the
FHA could be proven by the discriminatory effect of a housing
practice, even absent proof of discriminatory intent. HUD also
accepted the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision's holding that a
discriminatory effect under the FHA could include a housing practice
that perpetuates racial residential segregation in a community,
independent of the effect of the practice on the groups that are
protected by the FHA. HUD adopted a simplified burden-shifting test
for establishing when a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.
However, the four evidentiary factors that the 1977 Seventh Circuit
decision identified as necessary to evaluate to determine whether a
discriminatory effect violates the FHA 84 are substantive sources of
evidence that can be utilized to meet the burden of proof standards in
HUD's 2013 burden-shifting test.
VII.

SUPREME COURT'S 2015 DECISION IN TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY V. ICP

In 2015, the United States Supreme Court definitively held that
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.86 While the
Court acknowledged HUD's issuance of its 2013 rule interpreting the
FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability,8 7 the Court did not cite
HUD's 2013 rule to support its holding. 8 Rather, the key factors that
supported the Court's holding were the FHA's statutory purpose, its
results-oriented text, its 1988 amendments in light of the unanimous
view of nine courts of appeal that disparate-impact liability is available
under the FHA, and similar statutory language in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967.89 The Court acknowledged that government land use practices
that exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods could violate the

84 Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
8s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 11482.
86 Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525
(2015).
87 Id. at 2514.
88 Id. at 2516-25.
89 Id. at 2525.
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FHA, 90 citing two cases, United States v. City of Black Jack91 and
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of the Huntington,92 both of
whose rationales for finding FHA violations included that the
challenged housing practices perpetuated segregation in the affected
communities.9 3
The Court also recognized that prejudice is often unconscious
and animus is often disguised and that disparate-impact liability
prevents these factors from contributing to "segregated housing
patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit
stereotyping." 94 Finally, the Court was emphatic that the FHA should
be interpreted to promote its "continuing role in moving the Nation
toward a more integrated society." 95
In holding that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under
the FHA, the Court did note several limitations on its holding. The
Court cautioned that serious constitutional questions might arise if
disparity-impact liability under the FHA was based solely on a
statistical disparity. 9 6 If evidence of statistical disparities are offered
as proof of disparate impact, it must be established that the disparities
are caused by a policy of the alleged perpetrator of discrimination. 9 7 if
a housing discrimination claim based on a disparate-implicit liability
is brought, the alleged perpetrator must also be able to present a valid
interest served by the challenged policy as a defense to the
discrimination claim. Finally, the Court cautioned against race being
applied as a quota in a disparate-impact context because this would
implicate constitutional issues and would frustrate efforts to develop
race-neutral solutions to housing problems. 9 8
VIH.

RECONSIDERATION OF HUD's IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT'S DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD

In June 2018, HIUD announced that it intended to consider
possible amendments to HUD's 2013 rule implementing the FHA's
90 Id. at 2521-22.
9'
92

508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1988),judgment aff'd in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).

93 City ofBlack Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186; Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937-38.
94 Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
95 Id. at 2525-26.
96

9

Id. at 2522.
Id. at 2522-24.

98 Id. at 2523-25.

2019

ARLINGTON HEIGHTS AND THE FHA

805

disparate impact standard. 99 HUD is reviewing the 2013 rule to
determine if it should be revised in light of the United States Supreme
Court's 2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing and
Community v. ICP.'00
It is unlikely that HUD will disturb the perpetuation-ofsegregation basis of discriminatory effect liability under the FHA
embodied in its 2013 rule' because the Supreme Court in its 2015
decision recognized that one of the primary purposes of the FHA is to
combat residential segregation in the Nation.1 0 2 The perpetuation-ofsegregation basis of discriminatory effect liability under the FHA has
been successful at challenging zoning or other actions of local
governments that block the construction of affordable housing
developments.' 03 In its 2015 decision, the Supreme Court described
suits that target such local governmental practices as the "heartland of
disparate-impact liability" under the FHA.'0 4 Any efforts by HUD to
undermine perpetuation-of-segregation claims as a basis for disparateimpact liability under the FHA would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's 2015 decision.
The limitations included in the Supreme Court's 2015 decision
about the application of disparate-impact liability under the FHA'os
apply to perpetuation-of-segregation claims.' 0 6 How these limitations
would apply to a perpetuation-of-segregation claim like the Arlington
Heights case can be examined in the context of HUD's current threepart burden-shifting test for determining when a housing practice with
a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.1 0 7
Part 1. The alleged victim of discrimination has the burden of
proving that a practice of the alleged perpetrator of discrimination
caused a segregated housing pattern to be created, increased,
reinforced or perpetuated.'" A limitation on disparate-impact liability

I Reconsideration of HUD's Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Disparate Impact
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 28560-601 (June 20, 2018).
00 Id. at 28560.
1oi

Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.

11482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 20 C.F.R.

§ 100.500(a)).

102 Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
"I Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims underthe FairHousingAct, 20 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 709, 749-50 (2017).
104 Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2521-22.
05 Supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.

'0 Schwemm, supra note 103, at 728-29.
107 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2019).
108 Id. § 100.500(a), (c)(1).
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under the FHA imposed by the Supreme Court that applies here is that
a disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity should fail
if the plaintiff cannot identify an alleged perpetrator's policy that
caused the disparity.10 9 Thus, the Supreme Court emphasized that an
alleged perpetrator's policy must cause residential segregation to be
perpetuated in the affected community.
In the Arlington Heights case, all of the elements necessary for
plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof at part one existed. The 1977
Seventh Circuit decision relied on population statistics to establish that
Arlington Heights was a racially segregated community-in 1970, it
had a population of 64,884 of whom only 27 were black. 1 o MHDC's
planned low-income housing development would have reduced racial
segregation in Arlington Heights because it was to be subsidized by
the federal government which required the development to be racially
integrated."' When Arlington Heights denied MHDC's rezoning
request, the effect was to perpetuate segregation in Arlington
Heights. 112
A policy of Arlington Heights was at the heart of its denial of
MHDC's rezoning request. MHDC's rezoning request was denied
because it would violate Arlington Heights' land use policy of only
allowing R-5 (multi-family housing) zoning as a buffer between single
family homes and commercial, industrial and other high intensity
uses.1 13 The land that MHDC sought to rezone to R-5 was surrounded
by single family homes 114 and to rezone it would have violated
Arlington Heights' R-5 buffer policy.
Finally, the 2015 Supreme Court decision requires that the
implementation of the alleged perpetrator's policy must cause the
HUD's current regulation
perpetuation-of-segregation effect.' 1 5
involving discriminatory effects under the FHA includes the causation
requirement.116 In the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision, the court found
that Arlington Heights' decision to deny MHDC's zoning request "had
109

Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmly., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (7th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
1o

"

Id.

112 Id.
113 Supra note 20 and accompanying text.

114 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
115 Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523

(2015).
116 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2019).
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the effect of perpetuating segregation in Arlington Heights."' 17 The
Seventh Circuit found causation so MHDC and the other plaintiffs
could have established what is now described as a "primafaciecase"'1
at part one of the burden-shifting process used by HUD to determine
whether a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.
Part 2. If the alleged victim of discrimination proves a prima
facie case at part one, the alleged perpetrator of discrimination must
prove at part two that its policy is necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.1 1 9 This part is
consistent with the limitation in the Supreme Court's 2015 decision
that alleged perpetrators of discrimination must be given "leeway to
state and explain the valid interest served by their policies." 1 2 0
In the Arlington Heights case, defendants could likely prove
that the buffer policy in Arlington Heights' land use laws that was the
reason for the denial of MHDC's rezoning request1 21 was a substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest that met their burden of proof at
part two. None of the courts that considered the Arlington Heights
case questioned whether Arlington Heights' R-5 buffer policy was a
legitimate land use policy.
Part 3. If the alleged perpetrator of discrimination meets its
burden of proof at part two, the alleged victim of discrimination must
prove at part three that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interest proved in part two could be served by another practice that has
a less discriminatory effect. 1 2 2 Part three is analogous to the provision
of the Title VII statute that a party complaining of alleged employment
discrimination on a disparate-impact theory of liability can rebut an
employer's defense to an employment discrimination charge by
proving that an alternative employment practice exists that would
eliminate the disparate impact. 1 2 3
In the Arlington Heights case, the 1977 Seventh Circuit
decision explored alternatives to building MHDC's low-income
housing project at sites other than the one for which it sought rezoning
that would not violate Arlington Height's buffer zone policy for
1'7 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288.
''8 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.

1460 (Feb. 15, 2013).
'9
20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2).
20 Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
121 Supra notes 20, 113-14 and accompanying text.
122 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
123

42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2018).
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locating multifamily housing.' 2 4 The court remanded the case to the
district court to require Arlington Heights to identify any other such
sites that are both zoned R-5 and are suitable for federally-subsidized,
low-income housing. 125 After the case was remanded by the Seventh
Circuit in 1977, the parties settled the case in the district court agreeing
to an alternative site for MHDC's housing development. 1 26 Pursuant
to the settlement, MHDC developed its federally-subsidized, lowincome housing development at an alternative site in Arlington
Heights, and it opened for occupancy in 1983 to a diverse population
of residents.1 2 7 Thus, MIHIDC and Arlington Heights were able to agree
on an alternative site for MHDC's low-income housing development
that was both consistent with Arlington Heights' R-5 buffer policy and
achieved MHDC's and the FHA's goal of reducing residential
segregation in Arlington Heights. As a result, the Arlington Heights
case would have been actionable under HUD's 2013 rule for
determining disparate impact liability under the FHA while honoring
the limitations imposed on such liability by the Supreme Court in its
2015 decision.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The protracted litigation between MHDC and Arlington
Heights resulted in several significant legal decisions. The Supreme
Court held that residential racial discrimination only violates equal
protection if it is purposeful. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Seventh Circuit recognized disparate-impact liability under the FHA
and held that a housing decision that perpetuates residential racial
segregation in a community is the type of discriminatory effect that can
be actionable under the FHA even absent discriminatory purpose. The
Seventh Circuit also recognized that the FHA has dual purposes to
prevent discrimination on the basis of race and other protected
characteristics and to avoid the perpetuation of racial residential
segregation in American communities. Maintaining the perpetuationof-segregation theory of disparate-impact liability under the FHA is
consistent with both HUD's 2013 rule and the Supreme Court's 2015
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291-95 (7th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
124

125 Id. at 1294-95.
126 Supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
127 Supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community v. ICP. Its
application in the Arlington Heights case resulted in the construction
of an integrated housing development that furthered one of the primary
purposes of the FHA-the promotion of the residential integration of
the races in the United States.

